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Abstract: The postwar Soviet-American relations, circumscribed to the so-called period of the Cold 
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At the time of Nazi Germany surrender, the USSR recorded 20 million deaths and 
also considerable economic loss equivalent to its gross domestic product for six 
years. On the other hand, it would get important compensations by maintaining the 
conquests gained between 1939-1941, to which were added the North of Eastern 
Prussia and Czechoslovak Ruthenia. (Boniface, 1998, p. 7) 
The U.S. lost 300,000 people during the Second World War, which, relative to its 
demographic and military potential, was rather little. The U.S. territory remained 
sheltered from the direct effects of the conflagration, significant being (among the 
other things) that during that period the U.S. airspace had only been penetrated by 
one (Japanese) enemy aircraft and its charge resulted in the burning of a forest 
area. Overall, World War II stimulated the American industrial potential. Thus, the 
gross domestic product doubled, reaching almost 50% of world production. The 
dollar would become the currency of international trade, event established through 
the Bretton Woods agreements of 1944. (Boniface, 1998, p. 7) 
In 1945, the U.S. owned two-thirds of the world merchant fleet, ranked first in all 
areas of production and also held the monopoly over the atomic weapon. 
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The postwar US-Soviet relations are also interesting to observe from the 
perspective of the psychology of international relations. Walter Lippmann said in 
1944 that, concerning the perception of the USSR by the White House, the 
Americans should avoid any exaggeration: neither excessive pessimism, nor 
oversized optimism but only tracking vital interests, under the aegis of protecting 
the Western parliamentary democracies. (Lippmann, 1944, p. 130) 
In October 1945, at the meeting of foreign ministers in London, an American 
observer noted that the Soviets substantially altered their attitude towards the 
Americans, meaning that, during the course of the Second World War, they had 
cultivated friendly relations with the U.S.A., and they subsequently, they adopted 
an increasingly glacial position. (Kissinger, 1998, p. 397) 
From the beginning, the Americans had considered a direct confrontation with the 
USSR impossible. A tremendous distance should have been crossed and about that 
there was a kind of writticism which read: the U.S. could not invade and occupy 
the Urals through Alaska, as could not the USSR invade and occupy the 
Mississippi River Valley through Siberia. At least during 1944-1948, no notable 
military strategist from Washington would take seriously such a scenario. 
(Lippmann, 1944, p. 134) 
On June 3rd, 1947, though President Harry S. Truman had been explained that 
there were all the conditions for the U.S. to build not less than 12 atomic bombs, 
the reality was quite different, in that, not even one had been assembled yet. The 
U.S. military strategy took into account the construction of approximately 400 
atomic bombs, their completion being scheduled for 1953, but the pace of 
production was still rather slow, despite official propaganda, extremely 
imaginative, and the increasingly tense atmosphere, directed towards a radical anti-
communist speech. (Johnson, 2003, p. 431) 
The 1950s brought to the fore the personality of Senator Joe McCarthy, the initiator 
of the so-called “ witch-hunt”, who argued that in the U.S. State Department would 
have worked no less than 250 supporters of the Communist Party. The hysteria of 
McCarthyism divided the country for a while, the Senator seemed convincing to 
many through the harshness of his interventions and the certainty with which he 
delivered to the media a lot of information which later on proved partially false. A 
radical Republican, McCarthy was in fact a character obsessed with acquiring fast 
a nationwide reputation. Therefore, what he called an anticommunist crusade, had 
largely a promotional motivation, his extreme self-centeredness and untidy private 
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life, gradually eroding his public image and then compromising it for good in the 
eyes of the Americans. On the other hand, the period of McCarthy”s rise coincided 
(as noticed by Paul Johnson) with the collective drama the U.S. lived by their 
involvement in the conflict in Korea. (Johnson, 2003, pp. 447-448) 
Not least, the victory of communist forces in China (1949) had a devastating 
psychological impact on the public opinion and the political elite in the U.S. 
Basically, this event had modeled for years the specific of Washington foreign 
policy. The dominant feeling was one of frustration and insecurity, and the initial 
belief, that communism could be stopped and kept away from the geopolitical 
space controlled by the Americans, was shattered. (Priestland, 2012, p. 467) 
The 1953-1961 interval (corresponding to the Eisenhower administration) was 
considered by American historians as equivalent to a mini-era of prosperity of the 
country, given that the President”s image was already partially mythologized, due 
to his exceptional military value, proved in the course of World War II. General 
Eisenhower illustrated (perhaps better than many other American politicians), the 
type of traditionalist, Christian practitioner statesman, driven by the belief that 
significance of the last universal conflict would amount to a decisive struggle 
between the forces of Good and Evil. (Priestland, 2012, p. 406) 
The U.S. considered that Stalin”s disappearance (1953) correlated with some 
tension and adversity recorded inside the Kremlin, would have created a 
encouraging premise for a certain weakening of the USSR. The Eisenhower 
administrated admitted, however, that the U.S. needed to look more realistically at 
the international political landscape, admitting that the communist ideology could 
be a tempting model in those areas that had suffered in the colonial period, or, 
during the years of the last World War. True to his spiritual formation, President 
Eisenhower was convinced that the U.S. needed to win the hearts and minds of the 
peoples of the world in a pragmatic and intelligent manner, the ultimate pursued 
goal being to divert the political leaders of those nations from the seduction of 
communism. (Priestland, 2012, p. 468) 
This approach did not at any time weaken the usual vigilance of Washington 
against the USSR and its allies, the Secretary of Stat Dulles (for example), stating 
repeatedly that in his view, the communist ideology was an international 
conspiracy and in no case could it be explained as having local roots, the role of the 
USSR in orchestrating it being essential. 
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Some exaggerations regarding the Communist threat also appeared, as there was a 
tendency to consider any radical nationalism from a social point of view, as a 
potential danger of communist extraction. The experts in Washington considered 
the direct US-Soviet clashed equivalent with a utopian confrontation between a 
whale and a elephant. (Lippmann, 1944, p134) 
The Americans and the Soviets could only confront each other through 
intermediaries, allies or satellites, and if such a conflict would be globalized, the 
issue of a frontal collision would have been raised. A seemingly paradoxical 
conclusion was reached, according to which, peacekeeping was determined by 
maintaining the equilibrium of the specific external policies of their ideological or 
strategic partners. One of the scenarios constructed by the Americans in the 
postwar years stated that if the USSR would eventually conclude an alliance with 
Germany, Japan or other important country (usually Western), the risks of a new 
conflict would be significantly increased. (Lellouche, 1992, p. 98) 
Combining the arming constancy with active defensive diplomacy, the U.S. relied 
on the effect of the unpredictable. According to this view, the USSR had to expect 
a surprise reaction at any moment, as did America itself which treated the Soviet 
colossus with the utmost concern and seriousness. Prior to George Kennan‟s 
famous article, since April 1946, the new direction of the U.S, foreign policy took 
shape. (Loth, 1997, p. 105) 
George Kennan plastically sketched for the first time, in a registry of a gravity that 
the politicians from Washington had not for long known , the image of a Soviet 
state perceived from within its inner fiber. As if he would have projected a beam of 
X-rays, Kennan was ambitious to make a radiograph of the clotting substance of 
the USSR and concluded that Lenin and Stalin”s homeland is nothing but a huge 
collective prisons meant for self-destruction. It was worse that Kennan‟s analysis 
targeted the very historic structures of the Russian mentality, which he considered 
incompatible with the ideals of freedom and democracy. “Evil resides in the 
Russians‖ proclaimed Kennan and the USA basically received the first serious 
impulse of the future strategy for stopping the spread of communism. (Kissinger, 
1998, p. 411) 
In a speech to Congress on March 12th, 1947, the U.S. President Harry S. Truman 
stated, inter alia: 
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“I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who 
are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I 
believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own 
way‖. (Boniface, 1998, pp. 12-13) 
A year before, in the spring of 1946, Truman also won a psychological victory over 
the Soviets, when asking them for the evacuation of Azerbaijan and the Russian 
forces complied. In 1947, a former advisor to President Roosevelt (B. Baruch) first 
used a phrase that will make career for many decades: “The Cold War‖. (Boniface, 
1998, p. 20) 
Prudent, Stalin was aware that he could not risk a confrontation with the U.S. at 
that time. Through the voice of sinister Jdanov, the Kremlin propaganda was 
emitting a stream of emphatic statements designed to build an image of power, 
which could be characteristic to the USSR. A sample: 
“Two groups have been formed in the world: one the one hand the anti-democratic 
imperialist camp, which essentially aims at establishing world domination, on the 
other hand, the anti-imperialist and democratic camp, whose essential purpose is 
to undermine imperialism, to strengthen democracy, to eradicate the tracers of 
fascism‖. (Boniface, 1998, pp.12-13). 
According to this propaganda, the USSR would represent a true bastion of 
universal peace, a state where the fundamental freedoms were observed and 
protected and the democracy of popular/proletarian type was the only truly viable 
democratic model. (Heller, Nekritch, 1985, p. 385) The Soviet media proved to be 
extremely active in this respect, controlled and orchestrated by the party and state 
apparatus. By contrast, the capitalist world (with the U.S. as the exponential leader) 
was presented either in dark shades or in caricatured manner, suggesting that 
capitalist democracy would be nothing but a huge ideological lie. The Soviet 
propaganda symbolism generated a multitude of textual, pictorial, graphical, 
auditory elements, which sought to induce into the collective psychology, the sense 
of superiority over the capitalist community, axiomatically considered as 
dominated by occult, selfish interests, fundamentally opposed to the fundamental 
interests of individuals. (Deutscher, 1980, p. 154) 
The coup in Czechoslovakia (February 1948) was the final impulse received by the 
U.S. and it generated the creation of NATO. The officials in Washington defined 
this body in a manner that combined in approximately equal doses, ambiguity and 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                        Vol. 6, no. 2/2014 
 10 
paradox “the predominance element of the power for peace‖. (Kissinger, 1998, p. 
415). 
It was claimed that NATO would not support territories, but principles, that it did 
not oppose change but the use of force, in order to produce change. 
The American legal experts were expressing their thoughts regarding the balance 
of the principle represented by NATO, the fact that an alliance against war 
appeared which did not share the basics elements of the most important duties of a 
typical military alliance. 
Obviously, as it happens in such cases, there appeared a kind of mythologizing. 
Many American analysts believed that the appearance of NATO, correlated with 
the state of mutual US-Soviet suspicion, was in fact, a difficult but necessary test, 
which in the U.S. would have to pass in order to demonstrate the viability of the 
values it cultivated. Some admitted that America was designated by history to be 
the moral and political leader of the “free world‖.(Kissinger, 1998, p. 419) 
“Only by the practical affirmation, both outside the borders and at home, of our 
essential values, we can preserve our own integrity, in which the real frustration of 
the Kremlin plans resides.‖ (Kissinger, 1998, pp. 418-419) 
It was not very hard to decode in the subtext of such statements, echoes of the texts 
of America‟s Founding Fathers. 
A decisive aspect of any military strategy is represented by the economic and 
human potential of that particular State. From this perspective, the USSR was at an 
obvious disadvantage compared to the U.S. For example, in 1950, the production 
of coal registered in the U.S. was of 505 million tons, while the similar Soviet 
production reached 268 million tons. The Soviet oil production was 37 million 
tons, and that of the U.S.- 270 million tons. The Soviet energy capacity was 90 
billion kW, and that of the U.S. was of 329 billion kW. The Soviet steel production 
in 1950 was 27 million tons and the U.S. one was of 88 million tons. In 1950, the 
USSR produced a total of 307,000 cars and trucks, and the U.S.- 6,288,000. 
(Houtisse, 1953, p. 56) 
From a sociological point of view the Soviet world had its own physiognomy, 
largely influenced by the ideological factor, even if we consider the prisons system 
in the USSR, where in 1947 there were 5 million inmates. Their role in the Soviet 
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economy was not minor, as they provided for 20% of the industrial workforce and 
over 10% of the industrial production of the USSR. (Priestland, 2012, p. 352) 
In 1950 the U.S. government made a considerable effort to speed up arming. There 
appeared new plants of serial production of airplanes, chariots, cannons. In three 
years term, the U.S. capacity of iron manufacturing industry increased by 15 
million tons of steel. The same phenomenon was registered in terms of electric 
energy. (Houtisse, 1953, pp. 55-56) 
During 1950-1953, the U.S. created an additional siderurgical potential almost 
equal to that of the United Kingdom. Almost naturally the question arises: how 
long would it have taken the USSR to achieve something similar? The main 
advantage of the U.S. over the USSR was the actual productivity of labor, aspect 
which the Soviet propaganda kept silence about or present it exact the other way. 
(Elleinstein, 1984, p. 503) 
Every American worker produced three to four times more than a Soviet worker. In 
the American food industry and agriculture were employed 9 million people that 
actually provided food for the 150 million countrymen, and still a more than 
sufficient production remained for export. In the USSR, five times more workers 
produced a significantly less amount. The USSR was recognized a unique 
superiority: that of human effectives. From this point of view, the American 
strategists believed that the Soviet troops could prove superior in a possible 
confrontation with military less equipped countries in the Middle East. 
During 1945-1946, Winston Churchill suggested almost imperatively to the U.S. to 
take the responsibility (along with the U.K. and other possible Western allied 
countries) of giving a decisive blow to the Soviets, considering that the Westerners 
would not be able to find soon a more favorable opportunity then when the 
Kremlin military force was recovering from a colossal combative efforts that it had 
supported during the war. (Kissinger, 1998, p. 422) 
Churchill proved therefore even more radical than Kennan. 
Although the strategy of stopping the spread of communism was officially justified 
by a moral base and it had illustrated for many years a horizon of education, 
tradition and expectation of the American public opinion, it also had a number of 
critics. 
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One of the most competent critics was Walter Lippman, who pointed out that such 
a strategy would case a huge shadow of responsibility over the U.S. and would 
cause a quasi-permanent defense which would eventually dissipate the Pentagon‟s 
enormous military potential. The USA (in the opinion of Lippmann and his 
supporters) would have to continuously support a number of regimes more or less 
heterogeneous, theoretically animated only by a declarative anticommunism. 
The elements of democracy went into the background and the Pentagon might also 
have against it the time factor. The critics of the stopping the spread of communism 
theory proposed replacing the general principles with the interests of America, a 
return to a “realpolitik” which later, after the tragedy in Vietnam, Henry Kissinger 
would propose as essential principle of the State Department actions. 
The stopping the spread of communism theory postulated in fact a paradox, typical 
of the structure of American utopian elements: the ideological opponent (in this 
case the USSR) had to be finally converted precisely by the U.S. 
Some Wilsonian echoes are to be recognized here. After all, did not Woodrow 
Wilson (at his time) have the ambition to transform himself into a Christian 
statesman? On the other hand, moments such as 1956 exasperated the U.S. 
supporters. The Americans did not intervene, considering that the USSR was 
firmly determined at that time not to give up its hegemony over Hungary. The State 
Department took into account the risks of starting a nuclear conflict. After all, no 
moral principle could replace the immediate interests. 
The Pentagon officials must have probably felt relief when, in 1991, the Soviet 
Union officially ceased to exist. The condition of solitary superpower would 
actually constitute a real trap, confirming Lippmann‟s fears. The U.S. will finally 
get a categorical public image victory over the USSR, but the risks it had to face 
were not gone. As long as the bipolar system of power had dominated the 
international political landscape, the strategic and political movements and 
calculations were somewhat predictable. Multi-polarity has introduced a new set of 
challenges, for some of which, the U.S. proved it was not at all prepared. 
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